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Abstract The study formulated and evaluated a model for effective management of ma-
licious nodes in mobile Ad-hoc network based on Ad-Hoc on- demand distance
vector routing protocol. A collaborative injection model called Collaborative
Injection Deterrence Model (CIDM) was formulated using stochastic theory.
The definition of the model was presented using graph theory. CIDM was
simulated using three different scenarios. The three scenarios were then com-
pared using packets delivery ratio (PDR), routing load, throughput and delay
as performance metrics. The simulation result showed that CIDM reduce con-
siderably the rate of packets dropped caused by malicious nodes in MANET
network. CIDM did not introduce additional load to the network and yet with
produce higher throughput. Lastly, the access delay with CIDM is minimal
compared with convectional OADV. The study developed a model to mete out
a punitive measure to rogue nodes as a form of intrusion deterrence without
degrading the overall performance of the network. The well known CRAWDAD
dataset was used in the simulation.
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1. Introduction
Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is an example of distributed network which com-
prises of mobile nodes with no central coordinating unit, generally dynamic and het-
erogeneous in nature, and all the nodes are battery powered [22]. Collaboration is the
main thrust of MANET. This form of network is very spontaneous and self-organizing;
and this has proved very useful in emergency situation especially in military warfare.
Nevertheless, the distributed, dynamic and infrastructure less nature of MANETs
makes it very vulnerable to network attacks. One active network attack is Black hold
attack, this attack result in network traffic distortion. The attacks in this category are
denial of service (DoS) attack [11, 26], network packet editing (modification, repli-
cation and deletion of exchange data), traffic distortion, IP spoofing [11, 30]. The
aim of these attacks mostly is to dwindle network communication performance of the
network by attacking neighbouring nodes [20, 21, 24]. It was reported in [2] that
incessant recurring attacks by blocked malicious nodes having their full power and
computing resources intact have been one of the main problems militating against
widespread deployment of MANETs. Despite the presence of Intrusion Detection
Systems in ad-hoc networks, malicious nodes have been able to spoof their IP and
MAC addresses and re-launch attacks after being blocked. It is therefore very neces-
sary to develop a strong deterrence system that will not only block malicious systems,
but goes a step further to proper effective management of such node(s) by running
down the resources of the node(s) through the collaborative injection from the one
hop neighbours. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that would to de-
cisively manage a malicious node by meting some punitive measures to any offending
nodes in the network.
The paper presents a model that manages a malicious node by flooding the of-
fending node with replicated deluge packets by one-hop neighbor nodes to run down
the resources of the malicious node. Thus, the system is referred to as collaborative
intrusion deterrence model (CIDM). It serves as deterrence against future misbehav-
ior of any node in the network. This new security model – based on CIDM – is
thus proposed for MANETs (which is applicable to other distributed systems with
a little or no modification) was inspired by the natural defensive mechanism of the
biological Octopus. Most octopus species are equipped with an ink sac that spews
out a stream of dark liquid called cephalopod ink into the water when the creature
is threatened. When frightened, an octopus often swallows water with its body and
ejects it forcefully. This not only propels the animal away from the danger, but also
forces out a trail of ink. This ink, which may be red, brown, or black, is made of
melanin, which visually distracts, confuses, and perhaps even frightens the predator.
Secondly, it paralysis the predators sense of smell or sight so that it cannot apprehend
the creature and lastly, the ink clouds the water to help give the octopus time to es-
cape. The technique employed here is the first time data flooding packet replication
was used to enhance security in ad hoc networks [4, 32]. The next section highlights
some relevant works on intrusion detection systems; section three presents our model
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design while section four discusses our experimental design in OPNET environment.
The following section describes our simulation results while section six concludes the
paper.
2. Related Works
The exponential growth and deployment of MANETs has made security issues in the
network an attracted some attentions in the research arena. Many researchers have
attempted to propose solutions to security mechanisms in MANETs. Shakshuki et al.
reported in [28] that their proposed model called Enhanced Adaptive Acknowledgment
(EAACK) requires both the sender and receiver to digitally signed and verified all
packets during communication. The proposed model implemented DSA and RSA
form of digital signature. It was demonstrated that the model has the capacity to
detect quite range of attacks within MANET but this increases the network load of the
network with narrow bandwidth. Also, the scheme did not propose any punishment
for such malicious node on MANET. Lui et al. in [19] developed a scheme which
can query each data packets sent over three consecutive nodes through the source
node to the destination node. The destination and every node on the path will be
required to send back acknowledgment to the source node. The arrival of TWOACK
packet indicates successful delivery of the packet from node say A to node say C via
some intermediate B. For instance, the arrival of the TWOACK is within a specified
time, any arrival outside the specified time is termed arrival failure, which define
nodes A and B as malicious nodes. The generation of TWOACK after some time
threshold,started to add extra load on the network, also this scheme do not apportion
any penalty to the malicious node.
Game theory applications have been explored to find lasting solution to MANET
security breaches. A game theory model was formulated by [15]. In the model,
the researchers presented the scheme as a two person zero-sum game. The service
provider which is the first player tries to maximize the detection of malicious node
by increasing its probability while the attacker minimizes the probability of been
detected by network IDS. The challenge with the work is that, it is assumed that
both player in the game have full information about the network which is not so in
real network. Even when the attacker is detected no punishment is stipulated for its
offense on the network. Another game theory solution for MANET that models the
cooperation and selfishness of the networks are discussed in [1, 7, 18]. The schemes
provide methods for each node on the network to decide either to transmit packet
or not transmit a packet based on the trade-offs involved. The energy consumption
and network throughput concepts involved in collaborating with other nodes in this
model ensures cooperation. This cooperation scheme ensures that a selfish node that
does not obey the network rules receives a low throughput. Like any other game
theory based solutions, this model assumes the complete information of the game,
which implies all nodes are fully aware of network metrics and structure. Farrahi
and Ahmadzadeh in [8] modeled an IDS Nave Bayes, with support vector machine
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and OneR algorithms. The model achieved better detection accuracy for DoS attacks
but also rise high false alarm rate for U2R and R2Lattacks. In the work of Subba
et al. presented in [30] modeled a Bayesian game based model for detecting back
hole attacks such as DoS and traffic distortion in MANET. The model uses active
Lightweight IDS to calculate the rate of packet forwarding of node ni . If the packet
forwarding rate is less than a defined threshold, the probability of been malicious the
node is updated using Bayes rule. The history profile of node ni is also updated using
Bayes rules. The system models the interaction between defender and node ni as
a non cooperative game. The model is well articulated and the result is profound,
but the model did not recommend and penalty for the offending node.
Senthilnayaki et al. in [27] developed an a model based on gain ratio as feature
selection technique. Two methods of classification techniques used was called support
vector and rule based machines. These were used to identify the class label in the sys-
tem. The model developed provided a higher degree of accuracy for detecting DoS but
have no penalty for the malicious node. Saxena and Richariya in [25] devised a model
that resulted in developing an intrusion detection model based on feature selection
and SVM which was integrated with particle swarm optimization. The analysis of
the model was profound, but the overhead of computing the employed SVM and par-
ticle swarm optimization was neglected which is quite crucial to the performance of
the model. The model also failed to take decision on the offending node. Likewise
a model was developed in [31] which used the technique of chi-square feature selection
and multi class support vector machine (SVM). The logic of the model is to develop
a multi-class SVM that decrease the training and testing time which can increase the
detection accuracy of malicious nodes on the network. Balajinath and Raghavan in
[3] employed genetic algorithm to learn users behavior pattern, the future usage of the
users can be predicted from the past history of the users. Any form of deviation from
users pattern is seen as intrusion detection. The users behavior is described in this
work using a 3-tuple: Match index, Newness index and Entropy index. The system
used the values of the 3-tuple as a command sample in the user session and then com-
pare it with non-intrusion behavior. In wireless environment, multi-agent systems
was developed in [23, 29] and [6] as a novel way of solving intrusion on challenges
especially in MANET environment. Other models used to address the challenge are
swarm intelligence [16] even the audit principle have been applied by Wang et al.
in [33] where the volume of data to be processed is massive for intrusion detection
purpose. Grey-theory also has been attempted as panacea for this challenge. Qin et
al. in their work reported in [5] proposed the grey theory which was claimed to have
some advantages and superiority on earlier used schemes because of its ability to cope
with large data. The scheme has no penalty for intruding nodes.
There are existing models that used the concept of information deterrence such
[9, 13, 14] and [12]. All the models are not relevant and cannot be applied to security
in MANETs environment. Therefore, so far in literature, we are yet to find a model
developed to serve as a deterrence system which can apportion penalty measure to
malicious node on any MANETs. The propose model is seated under an existing
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IDS, and offers some measure of punishment to the erring node by flooding such node
with packets from one-hop neighbors so that the computing resources of the node
especially the battery are completely depleted and removed from the network.
3. Model Design
The proposed CIDM focuses on effective method of managing malicious nodes in
MANET. This implies that the new model adds a new module to existing IDS system
models. In designing the CIDM model, the following issues were resolved:
i. The CIDM model is network-based because of the collaboration of neighbor nodes
in the injection process.
ii. Only one-hop neighbors of the malicious node are involved in the process so that
the entire network is not flooded by bombarding packets.
iii. The injection process has a threshold value after which the injection stops and
the collaborating nodes can do other internal processing or routing work.
Figure 1. The CIDS Conceptual Model.
Our model design depicted in Figure 1 represents a simple MANET environment,
where there is one malicious node at the center of the network.
The conceptual model shows one-hop neighbors around the malicious node which
are triggered by the CIDM neighbor to flood the malicious node with packets so as to
rundown the computing resources (battery power) of the offending node. The model
predisposes that all one-hop neighbors of a node are well connected and therefore
serve as a communication link to other nodes on the network. The aim of this model
is to prevent the malicious node from immediately going to spoof its IP and MAC
addresses and re-launch attacks after being blocked. Once, the battery is rundown,
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the malicious node lacks wherewithal to re-launch another attack. In designing this
conceptual model, we assume that an effective intrusion detection system that can
mitigate any act that breaches network security exists as a facility on the network for
security purpose. Thus, the CIDM sits at the top of this existing IDS system in the
network to further render an effective management policy that will make it difficult
for offending node(s) to re-launch any attack on the network.
The CIDM starts the process by initiating a counter that keeps track of nodes
in the network. The model then calls on the neighbor discovery facility in AODV to
discover the one-hop neighbors of any new node joining the network. In this way, the
CIDM node acts as the cluster head. Next it initiates the intrusion detection systems
and scans each node for malicious activity. If a node had already been scanned, it
transfer control to the next node and repeats the process. Once a malicious activity
has been detected, the CIDM launches its response model by first, collecting the
parameters of the offending node from the IDS system, then checks its routing table
for one-hop neighbors of the node. It then sends an injection command to all the
one-hop neighbor-nodes instructing them to send packets to the malicious node for
a time frame. The inject command includes the amount of packets to inject and the
length of time necessary to achieve the bombardment after which the process starts all
over. This period of collaborative injection i.e. the amount of packets to be injected
by the 1-hop neighbors is determined by number of 1-hop neighbors surrounding the
malicious node and also by the present value of the battery power of the malicious
node. Figure 2 presents the algorithm in form of flowchart. It is interesting to
know that there will not be much increase in the routing protocol overhead of the
CIDM despite the collaborative injection, since the injection is carried out only by
one-hop neighbors of the malicious node. The operation of CIDM is to augment
conventional IDS, thus present a formal definition of MANET using graph theory.
Also, CIDM model was formulated using stochastic theory which is presented in the
following section.
3.1. MANET Formal Definition Using Graph Theory
In developing an algorithm for CIDM, a model that deters malicious nodes from re-
attempting attacks on a MANET network system, there is the need to capture the
essential characteristics of a MANET. A MANET was formally described using Graph
representation as: Let M be a MANET with state space S, the elements of M are
mobile devices V according to Larson and Hedman [17]. Each mobile node in V is
a pobabilistic finite state machine. A MANET is a random process defined as a graph
(Gt) and a space (St) at time t, that is,
M = (Gt, St) (1)
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Figure 2. CIDM Algorithm.
Where a graph is defined as a set of mobile nodes (V ) and edges/links (E) that is,
Gt = (V, E) (2)
V = V1, V2, V3, . . . , VN (3)
E = (Vx, Vy) : Vx 6= Vy&(Vx
∧
Vy) ∈ V (4)
SN = Vi, Vi (5)
Li = (xi, yi, zi) (6)
Where x, y and z are the space coordinates of location L at any particular time.
From Equation (1), GN is a graph with mobile node set V and a set of link (edges)
EN . SN is the set of mobile node V at location L, subject to Markov, mobility and
medium constraints which is presented in the following section.
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3.1.1. The Markov Chain Mobility constraints
Let Pt, Qt, be the current state of the MANET network, then the next state of the
network will then be Pt+1, Qt+1 which is not dependent on the preceding states (P1,
Q1), . . . (Pt−1, Qt−1), this is referred to as Markov chains. The transitional mobility
probabilities will then be Pr [(Pt+1, Qt+1) | (Pt, Qt)] are independent of t. The
transitional probabilities will then generate the mobility distribution of this network.
µ is definitely determined by the internal states of the nodes of P and nature. The
mobility variables are defined as follows:
i. dist(Np, Nq) t is the distance between nodes x and y at time t
ii. n is the number of nodes and i is the index and i = 1, 2, . . . , n
iii. Ap(t) is the average distance for node p to all other nodes at time t
iv. Mp is the average mobility for node p
v. T is the simulation time and ∆t is the simulation step
vi. Mb is the mobility for entire MANET
Apt =
∑n
t=1 dist(nxni)
n− 1 (7)∑T
t=0 | (At −Ax(t+ ∆t)) |
T −∆t (8)
Mb =
∑n
t=1Mi
n
(9)
3.1.2. The Markov constraints Communication medium constraints
In a MANET environment, the following communication medium constraints hold:
i. If p transmits a packet at time t, this is received simultaneously at time t′ > t
by its neighbors, then the source node is promiscuous.
ii. Bidirectional: If p and q are neighbors, then q will receive any message transmit-
ted by p and p will likewise receive any message transmitted by q.
iii. a node p cannot be connected back to itself
From the foregoing, the data structure of the communication between the nodes
can be captured by an n×m matrix as shown in equation (10) below for a MANET
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with 10 nodes.
P =
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
A B C D E F G H I J
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
(10)
Matrix 1: Incidence Matrix of Graph G with 10 nodes
3.2. Simulation Data Preparation
The standard dataset used for the simulation of the Collaborative Intrusion Deter-
rence Model (CIDM) was obtained from the CRAWDAD (A Community Resource
for Archiving Wireless Data at Dartmouth) dataset [10] from Dartmouth University.
This dataset was collected from the outdoor runs of MANET based on the AODV
algorithm. The outdoor experiment for the dataset took place on an athletic field
measuring 225 meters by 365 meters far off from the campus center to prevent in-
terference from hotspots. The routing experiments ran on top of 41 laptops. Forty
laptops ran the protocol and one was used as the control system. The wireless radio
of each laptop was set to transmit at 2 Mbps. Finally, each laptop had a GPS unit
attached to the serial port to locate the 3−dimensional coordinates of each node. The
traffic for the network was generated by special traffic generators installed on each
node. These generators send streams of packets to randomly selected nodes in the
network. Users moved continuously throughout the experiment.
3.2.1. Dataset format
There are four types of line entries:
i. TIN [size] [seconds portion of timestamp] [usecs portion of time stamp] [src] [dest]
[seq #]
ii. SIN [size] [seconds portion of timestamp] [usecs portion of time stamp] [src] [dest]
[previous hop ip] [seq #]
iii. TOUT [size] [seconds portion of timestamp] [usecs portion of time stamp] [src]
[dest] [seq #]
iv. SOUT [size] [seconds portion of timestamp] [usecs portion of time stamp] [src]
[dest] [previous hop ip] [seq #]
The TIN (In from Tunnel) entries describe a packet that was generated by this
node’s traffic generation process and that is being passed down to the routing layer
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to be sent out on its way. The TOUT (Out over Tunnel) entries describe a packed
generated by a traffic generation process arriving safely at its destination. The SIN
(In from Socket) and SOUT (Out over Socket) entries describe the transmission and
receipt of a traffic generation packet, respectively, at a hop-by-hop level Table 1. In
other words, if a packet is generated by the traffic gen program at node 1 bound for
node 3, and to get there it bounces first from 1 to 2 then 2 and subsequently to 3,
then a TIN for this packet will appear at 1, a TOUT at 3, and a SOUT at 1, SIN at
2, SOUT at 2, and SIN at 3.
Table 1
CRAWDAD sample data generated from node1 (Source: [19]).
Process Size Time (sec) Source Address Destination Address No
TOUT 1110 1066402501 158907 11.0.0.1 11.0.0.3 1
TIN 1110 1066402501 302979 11.0.0.28 11.0.0.1 1
TIN 1110 1066402501 314045 11.0.0.3 11.0.0.1 1
TIN 1110 1066402501 392057 11.0.0.26 11.0.0.1 1
TIN 1110 1066402501 457447 11.0.0.18 11.0.0.1 1
TIN 1110 1066402502 450568 11.0.0.48 11.0.0.1 1
TIN 1110 1066402502 502602 11.0.0.40 11.0.0.1 1
TOUT 1110 1066402513 188667 11.0.0.1 11.0.0.3 2
TIN 1110 1066402513 329668 11.0.0.3 11.0.0.1 2
3.2.2. Packet statistics
The results of packets generated and used to inject malicious node are shown in
Figure 3. The injection to one black hole node was done with the consideration
of the available battery power to the malicious node and also with number of 1-
hop neighbor surrounding the malicious. This process generated a 5-second packet
injection to malicious node so that the network is not congested with packets. The
packet injected was generated within the network using data from CRAWDAD dataset
as the prototype data guide.
4. Experimental Design of AODV routing protocol in OPNET
The experiment for the work was setup using the wizard, which was a campus net-
work with an area of dimensions 1 km × 1 km was designed with 40 mobile nodes
and a server was deployed. The mobile nodes and the server were spread randomly
within the geographical area. In this scenario, the mobile nodes received traffic from
a common source. The Ad Hoc routing protocol was set to AODV and UDP traffic
used to study the effects of the protocol. This will enable an evaluation of the per-
formance of the protocol in UDP based applications such as web and file transfer. In
the profile configuration, an SNMP application was deployed for our study. All other
settings were left at the default: the nodes were WLAN mobile clients with a data
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Figure 3. Packet statistics showing injection to node 15.
rate set at 11 Mbps operating with a default power of 0.005 watts, the destination
was a WLAN server also with a data rate of 11 Mbps and transmitting with 0.005
watts power. For mobility, random waypoint mobility model was used because it is
a simple and widely accepted mobility model to depict more realistic mobility be-
haviour. The nodes move at a constant speed of 10 m/s. When the node reaches its
destination, it pauses for 300 seconds and then chooses a new random destination.
The experiment was simulated for 3600s. Table 2 shows the parameter settings for
the first experiment, while Figure 4 shows the experiment design environment.
Table 2
Parameter settings for normal AODV protocol implementation.
Process Size
Simulation Time (s) 3600
Number of nodes 40
Simulation Area (m) 1000× 1000
Mobility Model Default Random Waypoint
Pause Time (s) 300
Mode Speed (m/s) 10
Transmit Power (W) 0.005
Data Rate (Mb/s) 11
Packet Reception Power Threshold (dBm) -95
Traffic SMNP
Traffic Model UDP
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11b
Packet Size (bytes) 1200
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To make a case of black hole attack, nodes 10 and 15 was randomly taken as
malicious nodes on the network. The additional parameters and changes to config-
urations of the malicious nodes 10 and 15 which exhibit anomalous behaviour are
given in Table 3. The buffer size was made very small for the node thus causing it to
become a sink for packets.
Table 3
Additional Parameters setting for Black hole.
Parameter Value
Has Function SHA-1
Source Node 1024
Packet Inter Arrival Uniform (1, 11)
Buffer Size (bytes) 1024
The design of the AODV MANET in OPNET was directly modified to become
a function within our collaborative injection deterrence model. Additional parameter
settings for the case of CIDM is shown presented in Table 4 while Figure 6 presents
the case scenario. After running the simulation, we observed the response of CIDM
on the malicious node 15 by gathering its object statistics. Node 14 was chosen as
the one-hop neighbour and its destination addressed pointed to node 15, which is
the malicious node. The destination address of node 15 was set to zero so that it is
effectively blocked from the network. The injection time was limited to just 5 seconds
so that the entire network does not become congested.
Table 4
Additional Parameters setting for Implementing CIDM.
Parameter Value
Node 15 IP Address 192.0.1.17
Node 15 Destination Address 0.0.0.0
Node 10 destination Address 192.0.1.17
Buffer Size (bytes) 256000
Injection Time (s) 5
5. Simulation Results Discussion
In this section, the simulation results for the performance metrics are: Delay, Routing
load, Network throughput and Packet drop rate. Global statistics for the entire
network was collected as well as object statistics for node 15 and present time-average
values were shown. The scenarios are: (i) normal AODV deployment without any
malicious activity, (ii) AODV with two black hole attacks and (iii) CIDM response
to the malicious activity. Further, the statistics showing the packet injected to the
malicious node 15 by neighbor node 4 is shown.
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Figure 4. CIDM simulation Experiment Environment.
5.1. Delay
Comparative analysis of the three scenarios presents interesting results as shown in
Figure 5. In all scenarios considered, it was observed that for Media Access, CIDM has
the lowest delay which means that routes in the network are always ready whenever the
MAC layer has traffic to transmit. Periodic routing updates keep fresh routes available
for use. The absence of high latency induced by the route discovery processes in CIDM
explains its relatively low delay. However for end-to-end delay, the performance CIDM
is lower than that of normal AODV. This is because of the injection period. This
implies that if a node is performing the injection process, any packet meant for that
destination will have some delays. This implies that the CIDM injection time must
be kept very low for optimum performance of the network. However, from the result,
CIDM introduction drastically reduced the end-to-end delay caused by black hole
attacks.
The MAC access delay in the network with two black hole attacks was a bit lower
than normal AODV routing protocol. This is consistent with the fact that a black
hole node advertises itself as having the shortest path to a node it wants to intercepts.
Thus network traffic is diverted to the malicious node without delay. On introduction
of our CIDM response, the black hole was completely removed from the network and
thereafter injected with meaningless packets to run down the resources of the node.
The blocking of the node removes all diverted traffics thus leading to considerably
less end-to-end delay in the network.
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Figure 5. Media Access Delay.
5.2. Routing load
For the routing load analysis, it was observed that black hole sent the highest amount
of routing traffic into the network followed by the CIDM. Following CIDM is normal
AODV with the least amount of routing traffic sent. This observation is valid because
of the route packets introduced by the black hole attack which sends reckless packets
into the network. Therefore, in terms of routing overhead, CIDM performed compara-
tively at the same level with normal AODV. The superiority of CIDM comes from the
advantage of its routing operation, since CIDM sends routing traffic into the network
only when there is intrusion in the network thus eliminating the overhead due to un-
necessary routing traffic. All intermediate nodes that are not one-hop neighbors use
cached information to relay traffic and do not send replies during injection commands.
Only one-hop neighbors respond to the CIDM command by sending injection to the
malicious nodes in the network. In summary, network routing load results shows
the effect of black hole attack on the MANET network. The load is much higher
because of fake RREQ and RREP messages in the network. This implies that route
maintenance messages increased with black hole attack. As shown in Figure 6, our
CIDM algorithm introduced a fairly acceptable amount of route load. The reason for
this is that our model injected packets to malicious nodes by only one-hop neighbors
of the offending node thus reducing route load. Also, the time for the injection of
packets was limited to just 5 seconds so as not to flood the entire network with CIDM
packets. Within the limits of our threshold injection time, it can be stated that it is
safe to deploy CIDM to MANETs as it did not introduce unnecessary packets into
a network.
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Figure 6. Routing load result.
5.3. Network throughput
Network throughput is defined as the amount of data that can be successfully delivered
from source node to the destination node. The throughput of CIDM was lower than
AODV throughput when the system was under attack by a malicious node as depicted
in Figure 7. This is due to network resources deployed to counter the intrusion to
the network. It must be stated that in evaluating this metric, adequate security
is not cheap to implement. More often than not, security for any system will take
additional resources for normal operation. Thus, resource usage is a trade-off for
implementing security. In military-tactical formations where security is of the highest
essence because of nearby enemies, reducing the throughput to combat the enemy for
some time makes sense. However, more research will be made in future work to see
how improvement can be made on this metric. Since throughput is the ratio of the
total amount of data that a receiver receives from the sender to the time it takes for
the receiver to get the last packet, a low delay in the network should translate into
higher throughput. We expected higher throughput for CIDM.
5.4. Packet delivery
Simulation result shows a very high rate of dropped packets when the network was
attacked by two black hole nodes. The two nodes act as a sink, dropping all packets
after diverting traffics to them. When CIDM was launched, it effectively blocked
and withdrew all computing resources of the two black holes nodes. Thus, the rate
at which packets are dropped on the network drastically reduced to the minimum.
Figure 8 showed the result of dropped packets without and with CIDM system at the
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Figure 7. Network throughput result.
speed of 10 m/s. The number of packets dropped without the CIDM was very high
but when CIDM was launched, it reduced the rate of packet dropped. We observed
low packet delivery for AODV and CIDM in the scenarios considered.
Figure 8. Rate of dropped packets.
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6. Conclusion
A cyber security model that meted some decisive punitive measure on offending
node(s) beyond mere blocking in a MANETs is likely going to foster more coop-
eration among the participating nodes than the present system. Thus this model has
the tendency of improving the performance of the overall network. In this paper, we
presented a model that withdraws the life battery of a malicious node on MANETs.
The withdrawal of the life battery is a more severe punitive measure than the mere
blocking of MAC address(s) of the offending node(s). This punitive measure serves
as deterrence against future misbehaviors in the distributed networks. Our model
implementation uses the existing IDS iterative scanning of the nodes on the network
before CIDM is lunched. This implementation is quite limited to simulation. The
model presented is very simple and implementable. Our research effort is to develop
a real life system, which will mitigate malicious nodes by making this model possible
in distributed system environment. Also, we are looking forward to develop a system
that will apportion stiffer punishment to malicious node on in this environment in
the nearest future.
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